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1 
 
Most of my lifetime has been spent wrestling with evaluation of 
wars.  World War I hung over my high-school years like the ghost 
of Hamlet.  The Spanish Civil War occasioned my first 
partisanship.  World War II claimed me as a minor actor.  The 
interminable and perplexing Cold War, with its ghastly flare-up in 
Vietnam, made me an anti-war activist.  Confronted now with 
George W. Bush’s peculiarly labeled War Against Terrorism, which 
convulses us all, I am compelled to revisit that presumably arcane 
discipline to which I was subjected at Oxford University in 1948 
and 1949:  moral philosophy. 
 
 
2 
 
In this essay, I want to apply an elementary axiological critique to 
the two great wars of the twentieth century, emphasizing the major 
pressure-point of argument about the decision to use atomic 
bombs to force Japan’s surrender.  I focus on (1) the judgment of 
an influential scientific elite about that decision, (2) the resulting 
public deliberation and its dominant vicious ethnocentrism, and 
(3) the damage of this miscarriage of values to the antinuclear 
cause, to which I subscribe.  A simple narrative can provide a 
preview.  Leo Szilard and his supporters perverted the 
deliberations.  The public swung over to their “only the atomic 
carnage matters” evaluation.  Lost to the peace movement, as a 
result, was the powerful support of the B-29 crews who saw at 
close range how awful these weapons were.  Paul Tibbets, Charles 
Sweeney, and colleagues became anti-nuclear believers to a man.  
In reviling their deed, the anti-Hiroshima, knee-jerk peaceniks 
shot themselves in the foot. 
 
 
3 
 
It has been particularly appropriate to enter this arena under the 
aegis of Iowa’s Project on Rhetoric of Inquiry.  What inquiry is 
more vital than the effort to think about the assignment of value to 
an activity that involves whole peoples ― Huntington (1996) says 
that it will pit civilizations against each other ― while bringing 
death and destruction to the furthest corners of the earth? 
 
 
4 
 
Public discourse on all these wars exhibits a peculiar blindness to 
this discipline, given that it faces directly such matters as war-  
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fighting morality.  Michael Walzer has written a popular treatise 
on Just and Unjust Wars (1992), but its writ does not run far 
outside academia, and even most academic disciplines ignore 
completely the considerable literature by Walzer’s colleagues.  
How is it possible for Paul Boyer’s By the Bomb’s Early Light:  
American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age 
(1985), a widely used book by an academic historian, to completely 
ignore every one of the many writers, even the relatively popular 
Walzer, on war-fighting morality?  Whatever trust one invests in 
fashionable belletristic writers, and I do put Boyer into this 
category, they are no substitute for Augustine, his interpreters, and 
successors ― both in the church and out. 
 
5 
 
I assume, but do not argue closely, a consequentialist moral 
theory:  political acts are to be approved or condemned on 
evaluations of their outcomes. This means, in making predictions, 
that we accept the judgments of probable consequences as 
estimated by authorities whose track records warrant belief.  This 
will satisfy no fundamentalist:  neither Christian millennialist nor 
Jewish messianist nor Islamicist.  If one must adhere to some 
more or less systematic code, I would opt for that of Human Rights 
Watch, which recognizes international laws and agreements that 
include the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Helsinki Accords. 
 
 
6 
 
Applying HRW standards to World War I, it is hard to avoid a 
negative overall judgment.  That great convulsion imposed the loss 
of almost a whole generation of young European males; and it 
resulted in the Treaty of Versailles, which planted the seeds of 
World War II without achieving any of the positive goals sought by 
Americans. 
 
 
7 
 
World War II, conversely, is almost universally thought to have 
resulted in a substantial improvement in the lot of humankind.  Its 
death and destruction were terrible, but it overthrew three 
execrable tyrannies, and the postwar settlements left their citizens 
clearly advantaged.  East Germans were probable exceptions to 
this outcome, and the Communist tyrannies in China and 
elsewhere were unfortunate; but few would want to argue that the 
monstrous German, Italian, and Japanese regimes should have 
been allowed to consummate their imperial objectives. 
 
 
8 
 
This judgment about World War II is often qualified, however, by 
an unanticipated consequence:  the development and use of atomic 
weaponry much more destructive and frightful than any previous  
Robert Newman 14 Poroi, 3, 1, June, 2004 
weaponry.  World War I did introduce chemical weapons, which 
universal consensus condemned; and aircraft were used for the 
first time, opening the way for bombing by Italy in Ethiopia, Japan 
in China, and Germany in the Spanish Civil War.  But the atomic 
carnage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought condemnation more 
intense than gas warfare or strategic bombing before Hiroshima.  
What should we make of that one strategic use of atomic 
weaponry? 
 
9 
 
War weariness and casualty shyness by the close of 1944 were 
powerful enough to cause General George Marshall to worry that 
the United States did not have staying power sufficient to 
prosecute the war in the Pacific to clear-cut victory (Matloff 1959).  
There was some talk of negotiating an armistice, as had been done 
in World War I.  But all the top leaders, including Franklin 
Roosevelt, knew that the virus infecting Japan had to be killed or a 
generation later the same imperial drive would reassert itself 
(Iokibe 1981; Villa 1976).  There had to be unconditional 
surrender.  The Japanese had to see that the race of Yamamoto 
was not destined to govern all of the Pacific Basin ― some 
Japanese chauvinists even contemplated a wider empire. 
 
 
10 
 
Consequently when Soviet entry into the war plus two atomic 
bombs enabled the Emperor to beat down General Anami, the 
effective Japanese leader, who demanded a fight to the bitter end 
(Asada 1998), there was universal rejoicing.  The American 
electorate overwhelmingly approved this use of the atom.  
Opposition was less than ten percent of those polled. 
 
 
11 
 
But this approval did not last.  The long and tortured argument 
over President Harry Truman’s decision finally erupted in 1995, 
with the cancellation of the planned National Air and Space 
Museum exhibit on the Enola Gay.  Public approval of Truman’s 
decision had dropped to about fifty percent.  The bitter argument 
that swirled around that strategic use of two nuclear weapons 
offers many insights into the ways that fallible humans make their 
most vital decisions.  Three tentative conclusions emerge:  (1) 
Scientific competence does not improve political wisdom.  (2) 
Ethnocentrism has horribly skewed public deliberation on the 
1945 decision.  And (3) the antinuclear cause has suffered greatly 
from misplaced hostility toward the Truman Administration and 
the crews that dropped the bombs. 
 
 
12 
 
Leo Szilard was a major player in the atomic story from the 
beginning.  Szilard had been involved with Albert Einstein and  
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Alexander Sachs in agitating for nuclear weapons in the first place, 
and he never gave up the pride of place he felt because of that 
initiative (Weart and Szilard 1978).  As a member of the Chicago 
lab that laid the scientific groundwork for making the bomb, he 
began early to think about its use. 
 
13 
 
Szilard believed that the Soviet Union would get nuclear weapons 
in the near future, that American use of nuclear weapons against 
Japan might alienate the Soviet Union and speed Soviet atomic 
research, and that the Soviets in six years would be able “to destroy 
all of our major cities in a single sudden attack” (Weart and Szilard 
1978, p. 197).  In March 1945, he wrote a long memo about these 
fears to President Roosevelt.  Szilard’s memo did not complain 
about government inattention to the policy advice of scientists, nor 
did he warn against early use of our first bombs.  Instead Szilard 
induced Einstein to deal with these matters in a cover letter, dated 
March 25.  The two documents were to be transmitted via Eleanor 
to Franklin Roosevelt, but he died on April 12 not having seen 
these messages. 
 
 
14 
 
With a new crew at the helm, Szilard found a channel through 
Matt Connelly, Truman’s appointments secretary.  The new 
president addressed this unusual correspondence in late May.  To 
Szilard’s consternation, Truman did not respond directly but asked 
Connelly to arrange for Szilard to go to Spartanburg, South 
Carolina to discuss the matter with James Byrnes, slated to 
become Secretary of State.  Szilard was not deterred; he took his 
friends Walter Bartky and Harold Urey south to see Byrnes (Smith 
1965, p. 51). 
 
 
15 
 
The confrontation of the three scientists and the canny politician 
became paradigmatic for relations between scientists and power 
brokers in the new atomic age.  The scientists claimed to take the 
long view, anxious to secure international control of atomic energy 
and avoid an arms race.  The power brokers were straining to end a 
war that was taking more resources than they had planned, against 
an enemy that seemed to grow more ferocious with each defeat, 
and the politicians wanted to obtain terms that would discredit 
fascism forever. 
 
 
16 
 
In A Peril and a Hope, Alice K. Smith presents the view of the 
scientists, not just Szilard and friends, but the view she attributes 
to scientists on the War Department’s Interim Committee and its 
advisory appendage:  Vannevar Bush, Karl Compton, Arthur 
Compton, Ernest Lawrence, Robert Oppenheimer, and Enrico 
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Fermi.  Smith distinguishes the beliefs of the scientific advisers 
from those of the Chicago Met Lab.  The scientists closest to “the 
nerve center of decision” dealt primarily with the immediate 
problem:  ending the war on the least costly terms.  The 
disengaged scientists took the long view. 
 
17 
 
This is a reasonable but incomplete analysis.  What Smith neglects 
is the assumption ― arrogant as I see it ― that working scientists 
had superior insight into policy because they were free of 
operational responsibility.  Szilard was the foremost proponent of 
this position.  The letter he carried to the meeting with Byrnes 
declared:  “Thus the Government of the United States is at present 
faced with the necessity of arriving at decisions which will control 
the course that is to be followed from here on:  These decisions 
ought to be based not on the present evidence relating to atomic 
bombs, but rather on the situation which can be expected to 
confront us in this respect a few years from now.  This situation 
can be evaluated only by men who have first-hand knowledge of 
the facts involved, that is, by the small group of scientists who are 
actively engaged in this work” (Weart and Szilard 1978, p. 206).  
Then Szilard complained that there was no mechanism by which 
he and his fellow specialists could channel their wisdom to the 
decision-makers. 
 
 
18 
 
James Byrnes is not my candidate for sage of the era, but one has 
to empathize with his negative impression of Szilard.  The 
scientist, too, was unhappy with their interaction:  “I thought to 
myself how much better off the world might be had I been born in 
America and become influential in American politics, and had 
Byrnes been born in Hungary and studied physics.  In all 
probability there would have been no atomic bomb and no danger 
of an arms race between America and Russia” (Weart and Szilard 
1978, p. 184-85). 
 
 
19 
 
Smith’s approving accounts of the Chicago scientist’s movement 
appeared in several issues of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
and in her 1965 book.  At the core of her book is the Franck Report, 
named after the chairman of a committee on Social and Political 
Implications of atomic energy.  In addition to James Franck, the 
committee consisted of Eugene Rabinowitch, Glenn Seaborg, and 
Leo Szilard.  Their first meeting was June 4, and their final report 
was ready June 11.  It warned about the possible impact of the new 
weapons.  The Franck Report became the most prominent artifact 
of the Chicago Met Lab, and a sacred text of the anti-nuclear war 
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movement. 
 
20 
 
Naturally the Franck Report was classified.  Despite the 
prominence of its authors, therefore, it dropped from sight until 
May 1946.  The naïveté with which it was received when it became 
available puzzles me to this day.  Franck himself carried the report 
to Washington, where it was turned over to the personal assistant 
of Secretary of War Stimson.  Smith believes that Stimson never 
gave it his “careful and personal attention” (1965, p. 46).  No 
wonder.  It is so internally inconsistent as to be incoherent:  clearly 
the product of a rushed, ill-informed committee. 
 
 
21 
 
Most, but not all, of the report emphasizes the awesome 
destruction to be wrought by these bombs:  “nuclear power is 
fraught with infinitely greater dangers than were all the inventions 
of the past” (p. 561).  Since many other nations know the 
fundamental facts of nuclear power, it is a threat to the United 
States.  This threat cannot be removed by building a massive 
stockpile; the only way it can be avoided is by creating an 
international authority to control all nuclear developments.  There 
is an “apparent defense,” involving “dispersal of those industries 
which are essential to our war effort and dispersal of the 
populations of our major metropolitan cities” (p. 564).  In other 
words, the U.S. could resort to Soviet-style commands to reorder 
the whole society.  But remember, these are physicists talking. 
 
 
22 
 
Then the text shifts to the immediate situation:  whether to use 
atomic bombs in the Pacific War.  Some officials want “to use them 
without warning on an appropriately selected object in Japan” (pp. 
565-566).  Now a totally different tone takes over.  “It is doubtful 
whether the first available bombs, of comparatively low efficiency 
and small size, will be sufficient to break the will or ability of Japan 
to resist, especially given the fact that the major cities like Tokyo . . 
. already will largely be reduced to ashes by the slower process of 
ordinary aerial bombing” (p. 566).  So the bombs may not be more 
dangerous than the munitions of the past. 
 
 
23 
 
But the tone shifts again.  If we actually use this bomb, “Russia, 
and even allied countries, which bear less mistrust of our ways and 
intentions, as well as neutral countries may be deeply shocked.  It 
may be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was 
capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon as 
indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a million times more 
destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such 
weapons abolished by international agreement” (p. 566). 
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24 
 
What do these people really believe about the power of the bomb?  
Only two alternatives are available:  (1) it is possible to create 
international agreement on a total prevention of nuclear war, or 
(2) effective international control is impossible.  Franck and the 
other members lean toward the first possibility.  But having 
already told us that dropping the bomb on Japan might not have 
much effect, they now shift to saying that “the military advantages 
and the saving of American lives achieved by the sudden use of 
atomic bombs against Japan may be outweighed by the ensuing 
loss of confidence and by a wave of horror and repulsion sweeping 
over the rest of the world and perhaps even dividing public opinion 
at home” (p. 566).  Therefore the United States should 
demonstrate the atomic bomb in a desert or on a barren island.  
Then, if the U.S. must obliterate a Japanese city, there would be no 
“wave of horror and revulsion” (p. 566).  But would there be any 
bombs left and would a low-efficiency bomb really obliterate 
anything? 
 
 
25 
 
Yet more puzzling recommendations are to come.  Atomic 
weapons have been compared to poison gas, which cannot be used 
because of world opinion.   Now we read that, after a 
demonstration and “an ultimatum to Japan to surrender or at least 
to evacuate certain regions as an alternative to their total 
destruction” (p. 567), we just might bomb them.  “This may sound 
fantastic,” says the report, “but in nuclear weapons we have 
something entirely new in order of magnitude of destructive 
power” (p. 567).  No, not fantastic, just confusing:  would use on a 
Japanese city shock the enemy into surrender or not? 
 
 
26 
 
Now the second alternative comes into focus.  Perhaps 
international control is impossible.  On this view, “early use of 
nuclear bombs against Japan becomes even more doubtful ― quite 
independently of any humanitarian considerations.  If an 
international agreement is not concluded immediately after the 
first demonstration, this will mean a flying start toward an 
unlimited arms race.  If this race is inevitable, we have every 
reason to delay its beginning as long as possible in order to 
increase our head start still further” (p. 567).  What would be more 
likely to induce “a flying start toward an unlimited arms race” (p. 
567) than increasing our lead as fast as we can? 
 
 
27 
 
Here the vast ignorance of the scientists is displayed.  The race was 
already on.  Stalin ratcheted it up several notches the minute he 
knew that the United States had a bomb, even though it had not  
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been used (Holloway 1994, p. 133). 
 
28 
 
Next a really obtuse discussion of the “stages of production” of 
nuclear weapons appears.  The U.S. had reached only the first 
stage but was on the threshold of the second:  “This stage probably 
requires no elaborate plans and may provide us in about five or six 
years with a really substantial stockpile of atomic bombs.  Thus it 
is our interest to delay the beginning of the armaments race until 
the successful termination of this second stage.  The benefit to the 
nation, and the saving of American lives in the future, achieved by 
renouncing an early demonstration of nuclear bombs and letting 
the other nations come into the race only reluctantly, on the basis 
of guesswork and without definite knowledge that the thing does 
work, may far outweigh the advantages to be gained by the 
immediate use of the first and comparatively inefficient bombs in 
the war against Japan” (Smith 1965, p 568). 
 
 
29 
 
In Heaven’s name, what inefficient bombs?  The ones that 
destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki?  But if these bombs were so 
inefficient, how could they save American lives?  And which 
nations did the Franck Committee think would come into the arms 
race reluctantly?  North Korea perhaps. 
 
 
30 
 
I trash this report not only because Smith thinks it accurately 
“forecast the course of the postwar armaments race” (p. 45), but 
because a freshman logic student would have little trouble findings 
its inconsistencies.  While it may not be indicative of total 
ineptitude on the part of nuclear physicists, it has to be seen as a 
warning against accepting scientific genius as a qualification for 
geopolitical savvy.  These scientists assumed that, because they 
knew how to make the bombs, they knew better than anyone else 
what to do with them.  Were there room here for a major 
digression, I would cite by way of contrast the deadly accuracy of 
that contemporary world-affairs expert, George Kennan.  He told 
us in 1946 that the Soviet Behemoth was not an ordinary Western-
style polity but that it was not another Nazi Germany, either, with 
a commitment to world conquest.  He told us for good measure in 
1949-1950 that the paranoia of the blueprint for the Cold War, 
NSC 68, was wrong, the decision to build the hydrogen bomb was 
wrong, and the assumption that the North Korean attack on South 
Korea represented the first step in a Soviet campaign to conquer 
Asia was wrong.  Scientists should not be the ultimate arbiters of 
societal values. 
 
 
31 
 
The scientists by and large were heeded; the prophet was not. 
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32 
 
But it is time to move to the venality of American and Japanese 
ethnocentrism.  In all the heated public discourse over the mission 
of Enola Gay, the predominant concern of those opposed to the 
bomb is the number of Japanese ― most, of course, 
noncombatants or “innocent” civilians ― who were killed and 
injured.  Those who think the bombing was right are concerned 
with the loss of Americans and other Allies who would have been 
killed had we needed to invade.  Arguments about whether 
Truman had ever seen casualty estimates in the seven-figure range 
for an invasion, the Japanese were ready to surrender, they would 
have surrendered had the U.S. dropped the “unconditional” clause, 
or they would have surrendered had we guaranteed the 
continuation of the Emperor are tangential to what is essentially a 
moral issue.  Only a handful of analysts, including the war-fighting 
moralists, cared about the victims of the Japanese Empire. 
 
 
33 
 
Awareness of the death and destruction caused by Nazi Germany is 
widespread in the United States.  Even my recent students, college 
seniors for whom World War II is nothing but Tom Brokaw’s pipe 
dream, know about the six million Jews killed in the Holocaust.  
Ask about the damage done by the Japanese Empire, and they 
know that we lost a few thousand sailors at Pearl Harbor or even 
that a “whole bunch of Chinese were killed at Nanjing.”  Some have 
heard of Bataan or the Bridge on the River Kwai.  What was the 
total carnage caused by the Japanese?  I have yet to hear an 
estimate in seven figures.  Yet the conservative scholarly estimate 
is twenty million, most other Asians. 
 
 
34 
 
Why the awareness of German crimes but ignorance of Japan’s?  
The Pacific War was far away from us.  Millions do not visit the 
434 Japanese prison camps scattered over half the globe; whereas 
Buchenwald, Dachau, and other Nazi camps are tourist magnets.  
Because Allied armies rushed into Germany and confiscated 
records by the ton, we have had hard evidence of massive crimes 
by Germans.  The Japanese had several weeks when tons of 
records went up in smoke between the end of fighting and the 
occupation by Americans.  In that period, biological-warfare 
factories disappeared, infected animals were loosed in the 
countryside, and most evidence that Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro 
infected the Chinese with plague, cholera, typhoid, anthrax, and 
glanders was destroyed.  Nazi creations from human skin and 
other atrocities entered the world of well-known artifacts. 
 
 
35 
 
Moreover the traumatic conquest of China by Mao upset American 
calculations for Asia.  Chiang Kai-shek had been for us the “Savior  
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of the Orient,” a Christian, a capitalist, a democrat:  people really 
did believe that in the late forties.  When Chiang fell, the Japanese 
became our sole bulwark against the Communists in Asia 
(Newman 1992).  This Cold War realignment discouraged 
Japanophobia; it even restored the Japanese to their previous 
status.  As Yukiko Koshiro explains, we never directly discussed 
the place of ethnic minorities and former colonial subjects with the 
Japanese. 
 
 
 
Instead, the Japanese and the Americans collaborated 
to restore the kind of racial hierarchy that had existed 
in the days of Japan’s colonialism.  . . . As the Cold 
War advanced in Asia, Japan was reappointed as the 
region’s junior leader, and the idea of pan-Asianism 
was restored.  . . . Thus, Japan was allowed to preserve 
― and resume under the Cold War sanction of the 
United States ― its presumption of superiority over 
other Asians.  Also, Japan’s racist wartime ideology, 
which had propelled atrocities against Asian soldiers 
and civilians alike, escaped scrutiny and 
condemnation.  . . . The postwar collaboration was 
built on a shared racist view of the world in which 
both nations assumed a duty to lead the “inferior non-
West” nations, a concept in which Japan was an 
“honorary Western nation” (1999, p. 107). 
 
 
36 
 
These factors obscure the price in death and destruction that was 
being paid every day the war continued in 1945.  They held 
irrespective of major battles such as Okinawa; the decisive cost of 
the war came from the death throes of the Japanese Empire.  The 
primary Japanese killing field was still China, but every other 
occupied nation was caught up in the slaughter.  This is where the 
ethnocentrism of the dispute is the most debilitating.  The only 
credible evidence of how long the war would have gone on in the 
absence of the atom bombs is the judgments of the Japanese 
leaders:  a majority said there would have been no surrender until 
1946 (Newman 1995).  At least five more months of war?  At a 
probable 400,000 deaths per month? 
 
 
37 
 
Ah, but these dead would be predominantly Chinese, Korean, 
Filipino, Malaysian, Indonesian, even lepers on Nauru, shoved off 
a cliff into the ocean when the Japanese wanted to get rid of them.  
Look at public discourse on the last six decades:  the text to 
accompany the Enola Gay exhibit at the Air and Space Museum, 
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the ABC documentary hosted by the witless Peter Jennings, the 
History Channel program in September 2003, the massive 571-
page reader on Hiroshima’s Shadow edited by Kai Bird and 
Lawrence Lifschultz (1998) with 542 pages of diatribe against 
Truman’s decision and 29 for it.  Take any source you choose, 
except the few non-American accounts of Japanese atrocities, and 
you find nothing whatsoever about the Asian lives saved by the 
bomb.  Paul Fussell and others in harm’s way will of course Thank 
God for the Atom Bomb.  The Truman-bashers regret the deaths of 
200,000 killed by the two bombs.  None of them even consider 
that the Japanese Empire was a slaughter house bigger even than 
that of Nazi Germany. 
 
38 
 
It is tempting at this stage to bring in some of the more graphic 
descriptions of what was happening in the far reaches of the 
Empire, even as the Americans were sweating a landing on 
Kyushu.  Gavan Daws is about the best, in Prisoners of the 
Japanese:  “Asia under the Japanese was a charnel house of 
atrocities.  As soon as the war ended, evidence of war crimes began 
piling up in mountains, POWs, civilian internees, and Asian 
natives starved, beaten, tortured, shot, beheaded.  The water cure.  
Electric shock.  Cannibalism.  Men strung up over open flames or 
coiled in barbed wire and rolled along the ground” (1994, p. 363). 
 
 
39 
 
Then there was the acceleration factor.  The last year of the war 
was what John Dower (1999, p. 299) calls the “most deadly” year, 
and others name the “killing year.”  All observers agree that the 
closer the war got to Japan, the more gratuitous killing there was.  
Thefts escalated of medical supplies and Red Cross bundles 
intended for prisoners and helpless victims of Japanese tyranny.  
The rage of the losing armies mounted.  As Laurens van der Post 
puts it, the frustrated Japanese, no more able to see themselves as 
the overlords of Asia and the Pacific, were going to “pull down 
their own sprawling military temple, Samson-like” (1971, p. 22), 
and destroy their enemies along with themselves. 
 
 
40 
 
The critics of Truman’s decision without exception ground their 
case against the atom-bomb deaths on the report of the United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey.  Commanded by Paul Nitze, this 
group spent two months in Japan in the fall of 1945 and concluded 
that it would have surrendered before we were scheduled to 
invade, so that the deaths of Allies from fighting on the Home 
Islands would not have taken place.  Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
wrote Nitze, were unnecessary to obtain surrender.  Unfortunately 
none of the critics went to the basic data.  The Nitze report was a 
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complete fraud, but its exposure began in earnest only in 1995 
(Newman 1995a; Gentile 2001). 
 
41 
 
Chinese always had known that the destruction of the Pacific War 
was borne primarily by Japan’s victims and that continuation of 
Japanese control meant continued casualties for them.  When the 
big controversy erupted over the Enola Gay exhibit, letters to the 
NASM defending Truman came not only from WWII personnel but 
also from Asians.  Astrid Pei wrote director Martin Harwit on 
September 18, 1994: 
 
 
 
 
As Americans, we are genuinely appreciative of you 
and your staff’s efforts in preparing the exhibit of “The 
Last Act:  The Atomic Bomb and the End of World 
War II.”  But as Asian-Americans, particularly those of 
Chinese descent, we feel we are being ignored and 
insulted, simply because while in the 14 years of war 
(1931-1945) between China and Japan, the Japanese 
had virtually killed over 30 million Chinese, nearly 90 
percent of them being innocent civilians, more than 
the casualties of all our Allies in World War II 
combined, no Chinese Holocaust which is doubtless 
worse than that of the Jewish has been planned in 
your exhibit.  Any discussion on war in Asia without 
due emphasis on the Sino-Japanese War is a 
distortion of truth and history. 
 
 
  
 
There were other, similar protests.  Given the determination of the 
curators to change the minds of those Americans who still thought 
Truman did the right thing, such pleas were unattended.  
 
42 
 
Many of the war-fighting moralists support the anguished 
objections of Astrid Pei and her kinfolk.  The most direct and 
specific is R. M. Haré, in an issue of Philosophy and Public 
Affairs.  He discusses the necessity for factoring into one’s 
judgment not only the noncombatants who are killed by an act of 
war, but those who are saved:  “I would include more people in the 
class of those whose sufferings are relevant to our moral decisions 
(for example, in the Hiroshima case, those who will die if the war is 
not ended quickly, as well as those actually killed by the bombing)” 
(1972, p. 181). 
 
 
43 
 
The bottom line is that intense preoccupation with the evil of 
killing noncombatants at Hiroshima and Nagasaki has effectively 
marginalized or suppressed the moral claims of the millions of  
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victims of Japan’s aggression.  Single-minded concern for the 
carnage of the atom has preempted the humanitarian 
consideration due survivors of Nanjing, the Death Railway, the 
Nauru leper colony, and other millions of victims, actual and 
potential.  It has taken fifty years for the victims of Japan to 
capture the attention of the international community.  One reason 
is the vehemence of attacks on the administration that ordered the 
atomic bombings. 
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In this category, one ill-informed zealot stands out:  Robert J. 
Lifton.  The considerable influence of his overly righteous 
Hiroshima in America (1995) has turned many toward the belief 
that the Japanese were the victims, not the perpetrators, of Pacific 
War horrors. 
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Some Japanese scholars manage objective accounts of their 
country’s rampage throughout Asia.  Seiitsu Tachibana’s 
discussion of “The Quest for a Peace Culture:  The A-bomb 
Survivors’ Long Struggle and the New Movement for Redressing 
Foreign Victims of Japan’s War” intelligently balances these two 
arenas.  He recognizes that Japan’s ills were self-inflicted, and that 
the atomic casualties must seek redress from their own 
government.  He also knows that the Japanese “have been slow to 
realize their role as victimizer.  Thousands of Asians suffered as a 
result of Japanese aggression during the war, and during the early 
1990s these foreign victims began to voice their long-overdue 
demands for compensation” (1996, p. 168). 
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Tachibana sees the invidious aspects of the Tokyo war crimes 
trials:  they ignored the crimes committed against the peoples of 
Asia, “giving the impression that the war’s Asian victims were 
unimportant.  Moreover the subsequent execution of seven class-A 
war criminals produced a general impression that Japan had 
adequately absolved itself of all war crimes and need not worry 
about additional compensation in the future” (1996, p. 169).  He 
sympathizes with lawsuits by the comfort women, forced laborers 
for Japanese firms and government, and the many other sufferers 
under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
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I come now to the American peace movement for abolition of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.  I have belonged to this 
movement since the 1960s, from the Vietnam War teach-ins 
through SANE/Freeze to the present Peace Action.  Its bottom line 
has always been the elimination of what George W. Bush wants to 
eliminate from all arsenals but our own:  weapons of mass 
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destruction.  Obviously the ideology of those now in charge of the 
U.S. Department of Defense is compatible with the objectives of 
this peace movement as I see them.  So what can the movement 
hope to accomplish?  The Point of No Return in the development 
of the Cold War was 1950, when the decisions were made to adopt 
NSC 68, build hydrogen bombs, and interpret the North Korean 
attack as Soviet-inspired.  Those fatal decision-points cannot now 
be called back for correction. 
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What can be done is to pare down the obscene nuclear arsenals, 
especially those under our control:  77,000 deliverable nuclear 
warheads of all sizes by 1997 (Gottlieb 1997, p. 79).  Presumably 
this was what various peace groups sought when they urged the 
anti-Truman curators at the National Air and Space Museum to 
retain the text for the 1995 Enola Gay exhibit that had Truman 
making the wrong decision. 
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NASM files on the Enola Gay exhibit overflow with letters to the 
curators.  World War II veterans and Air Force supporters 
demanded that the first drafts of the text be made less hostile to 
Truman.  Letters from the academic establishment and peace 
groups insisted that the anti-bombing slant be strengthened. 
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Martin Harwit, NASM Director and an innocent in the ways of 
Washington, vacillated.  He and the curators made several 
blunders.  They enforced anonymity, refusing to identify the 
scholars depended on  for describing the bomb decision.   They 
bragged shamelessly that the exhibit would incorporate the best 
scholarly research about the end of the Pacific War, yet they 
refused to consult a single credentialled historian of the war, the 
decision to surrender, or the development of the U.S.-Soviet 
nuclear arms race.  At the same time they promised veterans that 
the exhibit would display proudly the patriotic service of the men 
who won the war, they promised the Japanese that it would show 
the bombing as un-American.  Harwit wanted to reorient NASM to 
show “the dark side of aviation”  as he put it in the prospectus he 
wrote soliciting money from the MacArthur Foundation, dated  
November 1, 1988 and now in Smithsonian Institution Archives. 
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Hypocrisy was compounded by ignorance.  The NASM consulted 
no recognized  historians of the Pacific War, either American or 
Japanese, but it listened repeatedly to lobbyists for the special-
interest groups.  There is one pathetic set of minutes for a meeting 
on September 20, 1994 of peace activists with NASM officials.  
Father John Dear of Pax Christi organized representatives of 
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American Friends Service Committee, Physicians for Social 
Responsibility, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation to persuade 
Harwit and his curators to restore the tough anti-Truman tone of 
the original script, which had been modified under pressure from 
veterans and politicians.  Dear wrote of this meeting, “We talked 
about conscience and morality, and appealed to their integrity.  
Crouch and the curators did not speak at the meeting, and Harwit 
seemed exasperated.  He said to us, ‘Where have you been?  You 
are too late.  Why haven’t you been in before?  Why haven’t you 
talked to the media?’  Without making any promises to restore or 
strengthen the script, he thanked us for coming” (Harwit 1996, p. 
343). 
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Dear passed around a sign-up sheet to record the name, 
organization, and phone number of each participant.  Eleven 
NASM officials signed, four representatives of peace groups, and 
seven writers, most known to me as supporters of peace groups 
who had done superficial reading in anti-Truman literature, but 
none of whom had read all of the ULTRA decrypts, nor read widely 
in the Strategic Bombing Survey files.  Half of these true believers 
carried the imprimatur of the federal government; and they were 
under attack by the other half, who thought the NASM staff was 
craven. Obviously this sign-up sheet was not intended merely to 
record.  Did Dear think getting the NASM people to sign would 
stiffen their spines? 
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This was the first of three such meetings.  By Harwit’s account, the 
hottest topic was the number of expected casualties for American 
troops that the script should give for the scheduled invasion of 
Japan.  Dropping out of sight was the potent question that these 
people should have been discussing:  How can we convince the 
governments of the nuclear powers that the existing nuclear 
arsenals are unconscionable and must be eliminated?   Quibbles 
about casualty estimates highlight the sterility of the whole 
process.  Kai Bird, biographer of cold warrior John McCloy, 
participated.  As he said to the New York Times, “It was a 
humiliating spectacle.  Scholars being forced to recant the truth.  
Curators at the Smithsonian’s Air and Space Museum in 
Washington have been compelled by veteran’s groups to rewrite 
the text for an exhibit of the bombing of Hiroshima.  . . . During 
two closed-door sessions with representatives of the American 
Legion, they agreed to censor their own historical knowledge” 
(Bird 1994). 
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No scholars on relevant issues shared these meetings.  Nor was 
Nitze’s fraudulent Strategic Bombing Survey, the basis for most 
polemics against the mission of Enola Gay, grounded in 
respectable scholarship.  With Ronald Spector, arguably the best 
analyst of the Pacific War, scarcely a mile away at George 
Washington University, NASM consulted no historian of that war.  
Although it sent several parties to Japan, they consulted no 
authority on Japanese materials about the decision to surrender.  
Instead they talked only with curators of the Hiroshima Museum 
and other officials.  No biographer of Harry Truman darkened 
NASM doors.  The reigning American authority on the origins of 
the Soviet-American nuclear arms race, David Holloway at 
Stanford, was never approached.  Had the curators condescended 
to consult a professional student of war-fighting morality, there 
are several in the D.C. area.  My preference would have been Paul 
Ramsey, just up the road at Princeton. 
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Kai Bird could flatter the curators and their anonymous sources by 
calling them scholars, but attaching the label does not establish 
even one of them as knowledgeable about the Japanese decision to 
surrender.   They were special pleaders, determined to disabuse 
the American public of its previous belief that dropping the bomb 
had shortened a reign of terror and saved lives. 
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The attack on Enola Gay was an error.  The real task of the peace-
minded in the last half of the twentieth century was not to obsess 
on the frightful explosions of 1945, but to concentrate on righting 
the wrongs done to the comfort women, slave laborers, victims of 
biological warfare, and the other millions of Asians;.  Today the 
task remains to reduce the power and waste of the nuclear 
establishment.  The most persuasive advocates were precisely the 
crews who had flown the 1945 atomic missions.  None of these 
men were warmongers ― just the opposite. 
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Ted van Kirk, who navigated Enola Gay to her target, said at a 
509th reunion, “We’re as anti-war and anti-nuclear as anyone 
you’ll ever see in your life.”  Also at a reunion, Norris Jernegan 
added, “We’re here for the camaraderie.  . . . None of us celebrate 
war” (Meyer 1994).  General Charles Sweeney flew on the 
Hiroshima mission and piloted Bock’s Car to Nagasaki.  “It is my 
fervent hope that there will never be another atomic mission,” he 
has said.  “The bombs we dropped in 1945 were primitive in 
comparison to nuclear weapons today.  As the man who 
commanded the last atomic mission, I pray that I maintain that 
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singular distinction” (1997, p. xiii). 
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General Paul Tibbets thinks there are too many nuclear weapons 
in the world.  “But we’ve always had too many, I mean, there’s such 
a thing as overkill” (Meyer 1994).  Columnist Bob Greene’s Duty 
(2000) is a long tribute to the humanity and empathy of General 
Tibbets.  Frank B. Stewart, a navigator in the 509th, wanted the 
plane restored “to serve as a symbol so that this . . . will never 
happen again.  We’re not hawks ― nobody wants nuclear war” 
(Harwit 1996, p. 17). 
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Thomas L. Karnes, adjutant of the 509th, later a Ph.D. from 
Stanford and a history professor for the rest of his life, wrote a long 
letter to the Journal of American History protesting the left-wing 
historical establishment’s attempt to malign those who had fought 
the Japanese.  Karnes remembered Tibbets “as one of the most 
decent men I have ever met . . . and I remember Chuck Sweeney . . 
. leaving Tinian immediately after his Nagasaki mission to fly 
halfway around the world to bring a formal mass to thousands of 
Catholics on the island.  Then he raised money for an orphanage in 
Hiroshima.  Is it not about time to cool the rhetoric?” (1996, p. 
313-14). 
 
 
60 
 
By attacking these good men, who have spoken powerfully for a 
nuclear-free world, the peace movement  shot itself in the foot.  It 
is unfortunate that commitment to a fraudulent Nitzean narrative 
has alienated a large segment of the World War II generation.  
They are the ones who can talk from experience about the need to 
eliminate weapons that no one has dared use since 1945, because 
we saw then how horrible they are.  It is no defense of NASM, the 
History Channel, or the peaceniks to recognize that many veterans 
groups have been captured by Texas-style chauvinists.  An 
unbiased inspection of the morality of fighting that war justifies 
honoring and privileging the testimony of those who dropped the 
only two atomic weapons used in wartime. 
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Perhaps there will never be another war as morally unambiguous 
as World War II.  I certainly do not expect another situation where 
a nuclear weapon could save millions of lives.  Morality in every 
war has to be thought through on its own terms. 
 
 
 
 
© Robert Newman, 2004. 
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